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Abstract 10 
The road accident of a tanker transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) originated a fire and, finally, 11 
the BLEVE of the tank. This accident has been analyzed, both from the point of view of the 12 
emergency management and the explosion and fireball effects. The accidental sequence is 13 
described: fire, LNG release, further safety valves release, flames impingement on vessel 14 
unprotected wall, vessel failure mode, explosion and fireball. According to the effects and 15 
consequences observed, the thermal radiation and overpressure are estimated; a mathematical 16 
model is applied to calculate the probable mass contained in the vessel at the moment of the 17 
explosion. The peak overpressure predicted from two models is compared with the values inferred 18 
from the accident observed data. The emergency management is commented. 19 
 20 
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Highlights 22 
• Road transportation of LNG is increasing, this implying a certain risk 23 
• The BLEVE of an LNG road tanker –a rather unusual accident– is analyzed 24 
• The effects of explosion and fireball are estimated from the observed consequences 25 
• The correct emergency management avoided further damage to people 26 
 27 
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 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 2 
The use of natural gas (NG) as an energy source is widely spread in the European Union (EU) and is 3 
expected to increase from 44.5 x 1010 m3 in 2010 (Mertens, 2011) to approximately 2,5 x 1011 m3 in 4 
2030 (Kavalov, Petric, & Georgakaki, 2009). Currently, natural gas comes mostly from Russia (32%), 5 
Norway (28%), Algeria (15%) and Qatar (9%), the main importing countries being Italy (23%), 6 
Germany (22%), France (15%), United Kingdom (12%) and Spain (11%) (Mertens, 2011). In most of 7 
these NG-consuming countries, the gas comes generally transported through a complex net of 8 
pipelines; however, in some others, the gas also gets inland through Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 9 
seaport terminals and then it is distributed by pipelines and by road. LNG terminals have been 10 
pointed out as strategic infrastructures for covering Europe’s near future needs of NG (Cambridge 11 
Econometrics, 2010). At present, there are more than 30 LNG import terminals (Figure 1) distributed 12 
along the coastline of different European countries (e.g. Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, UK); some 13 
more are expected to be operative in the near future in order to fulfil the increasing demand of NG. 14 
With the proliferation of LNG terminals, it is reasonable to expect an intensification of the LNG 15 
regional road transport and hence an increase of accident probability. 16 
With the greatest number of LNG import terminals in EU, Spain has an intense traffic of LNG 17 
transportation by road, hosting the biggest LNG road distribution companies in Europe. On October 18 
20th 2011, a tanker having loaded 19,600 kg of LNG at the LNG terminal of Cartagena had an accident 19 
in Zarzalico (Lorca, Murcia, Spain). As a result of the accident, the tanker caught fire and eventually 20 
exploded, causing death to the truck driver. It must be said that this was not the first accident of 21 
this type in Spain; on June 22th 2002 a similar event involving a LNG road tanker occurred in Tivissa 22 
(Tarragona, Spain), killing one person and injuring two more (Planas-Cuchi, Gasulla, Ventosa, & 23 
Casal, 2004). Furthermore, it is worth noting that these two are not the only accidents registered in 24 
Spain involving LNG road transport, although they are certainly the only ones in which an explosion 25 
of the tanker occurred, and to the best of our knowledge, the only ones occurred worldwide.  26 
It is definitely important to conduct studies on the causes and consequences derived from this type 27 
of accidents, as they constitute the only source of experimental data available at full scale that can 28 
help improving safety in road transport of LNG. In this paper, the Zarzalico accident is analysed in 29 
order to raise awareness about such explosions and try to reduce its future impact. 30 
2 
 
 1 
2. ACCIDENTS OCCURRED IN SPAIN DURING THE TRANSPORTATION OF LNG 2 
Spain has registered 15 accidents of LNG road tankers during the last 15 years. The influence zones 3 
of the ports of Barcelona, Sagunto, Cartagena and Huelva, hosting around the 75% of the total LNG 4 
terminals storage capacity in Spain (Enagas, 2013), have been the most affected one. The most 5 
hazardous spot identified has been the area of influence of Huelva port terminal, where 60% of the 6 
accidents have occurred. Figure 2 shows the location, typology and consequences of the reported 7 
accidents. 5 different types of final events have been identified and classified from less to more 8 
dangerous, being the tanker overturning the most frequent one (7 of 15 accidents). This type of 9 
event hardly has major consequences; however, it can sometimes be the initiator of more serious 10 
scenarios, like tires and cabin truck fires or losses of containment, leading the latter to LNG releases 11 
that can derive into gas fires and explosions if there is an ignition source. Deaths have been 12 
accounted in some of the reported accidents where the truck overturning has been followed by an 13 
LNG leak. The most severe cases were the previously mentioned accident occurred in Tivissa, with 14 
one casualty, several people injured and a house spoiled, and the one of Zarzalico analysed in this 15 
paper, where the fire and subsequent explosion caused, besides the death of the driver, several 16 
damaged assets including a petrol station. 17 
 18 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT 19 
The accident occurred at kilometre 3.5 of the westbound lane of the A-91 highway (S 593036, E 20 
4164092) that connects Puerto Lumbreras with Granada (Figure 3). At this point, the hard shoulder 21 
of the highway is delimited by a 10 m height bank of soil and rock. There is an inhabited country 22 
house 90 m apart northwards from the accident point, which is next to the service road that runs 23 
parallel to the main highway. Next to the opposite lane of the highway, approximately 125 m apart 24 
from the spot where the explosion took place, there is a service area with a petrol station, a coffee 25 
bar and a rest area for heavy vehicles.  26 
Around 8 am, a truck driving westwards carrying two large precast concrete panels broke down and 27 
stopped on the hard shoulder of the highway, partially invading the lane (see Figure 4). Roughly 28 
twenty minutes later, the LNG tanker collided with the rear of the parked vehicle. Due to the 29 
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collision, the driver lost control. The tanker surpassed the parked truck, broke the guardrail and 1 
slammed into the ditch against the bank 20 m ahead of the truck. The tanker got leaning downslope 2 
on its wheels slightly tilted to the right, with his tractor head turned (scissor effect) and trapped 3 
between the trailer and the bank. 4 
Witnessed by several people who were at the service area, the tanker suddenly ignited just after its 5 
full stop. The fire quickly exhibited big flames, which prevented the driver of the broken down 6 
vehicle from rescuing his trapped colleague.  7 
The emergency services received a call reporting the accident at 8:21 am, which activated Lorca’s 8 
fire crews, located 31 km apart from the accident spot. When the fire fighters got to the place, the 9 
tanker had already lost a significant portion of the envelope and the insulation, and it was burning 10 
with clearer smoke, which revealed that the fuel involved in the fire was mainly coming from the 11 
tank content at that moment. 12 
Fire responders decided to block off a 600 m radius area and to cut the traffic completely due to the 13 
risk of an explosion. The fire trucks were moved 150 m away, and all people from the service area 14 
and several bystanders witnessing the scene from the bridge over the motorway were evacuated. 15 
Moments before the explosion, a shrill whistle from the tank was heard, the fire intensified, and so 16 
firefighters decided to withdraw to a distance of 200 m. Immediately after this, the explosion of the 17 
tank occurred.  18 
 19 
4. DESCRIPTION OF THE ROAD TANK 20 
There are currently two types of road tankers used in Spain for the transport of liquefied natural 21 
gas, in accordance with the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of 22 
Dangerous Goods by Road (United Nations, 2010). These two classes are different concerning 23 
basically the type of insulation, whether they are vacuum insulated or polyurethane insulated tanks. 24 
The former class comprises double-hull tankers, being the inner tank made of stainless steel and the 25 
outer of carbon steel. Thermal insulation is obtained by an insulating material (e.g. perlite) 26 
combined with a high degree of vacuum between both hulls. The latters’ configuration is single-hull 27 
tanker, made of stainless steel, covered by an envelope of polyurethane foam and a lacquered 28 
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aluminium shell. The tanker involved in this accident was of the latter type and so was the tank that 1 
exploded in 2002 in Tivissa (Planas-Cuchi, Gasulla, et al., 2004). 2 
The tanker main characteristics are summarized in Table 2. It has, centred in its bottom, a protective 3 
enclosure containing different valves and safety elements as follows: 4 
i) There are three filling and discharge outlets (two for liquid phase and one for gas phase) 5 
which have a double-valve system pneumatically operated. One of these is a plug seat 6 
valve, which guarantees the airtightness of the tank, preventing leaks through any of 7 
the pipes of the filling-discharging system in case of rupture. 8 
ii) Three safety valves, two calibrated at 7 bar (service pressure) and one at 9.1 bar (test 9 
pressure). These pressure relief devices have direct communication with the vapour 10 
phase of the tank at the mid-length of the top centreline through an immersion tube, 11 
which runs along the bottom of tank beneath the insulator and rises following the front 12 
of the tank to the top, where it connects with the vessel. The outlet pipe of these valves 13 
ascends, permanently under the polyurethane cover, surrounding the tank at its central 14 
part and running backwards along the top of the tank towards the rear end, 15 
communicating with the vent discharge device. 16 
iii) The enclosure also contains two emergency emptying valves, connected to their 17 
respective pipelines, which are fixed at lateral inner generatrices of the tank. The 18 
extremes of these lines reach the height of the longitudinal axis of the tank in such a 19 
way that, in case of overturning at 90º or 270º, one end always remains in the liquid 20 
phase and the other one in the gas, allowing emergency emptying. 21 
iv) Two maximum filling valves connected to siphon pipes which run upwards inside the 22 
tank up to its maximum filling height (United Nations, 2010); one of them corresponds 23 
to the 85% of the total tank capacity and the other to the 95% for emergency transfers. 24 
v) A control level device, which connects the liquid and the gas phase to their respective 25 
pressure gauges and calculates the fill level by relating the hydrostatic pressure of the 26 
liquid with the pressure inside the tank. 27 
As revealed by the pictures of the accident, the protective enclosure of the tank was hit during the 28 
crash, as part of it (in blue colour) can be seen in the middle of the lane in Figure 4. However, the 29 
images do not allow distinguishing which elements were affected, although it seems reasonable to 30 
5 
 
assume that some pipes not equipped with plug systems (therefore ruling out the filling-discharging 1 
system) were damaged. 2 
 3 
5. ANALYSIS OF THE SEQUENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT 4 
The analysis of the sequence of the accident by means of pictures and accounts of the witnesses 5 
and of the consequences observed on diverse points around the accident, together with the use of 6 
adequate mathematical models, can lead to a better understanding of what did happen in this 7 
accident and what could be expected in similar events. Moreover, this investigation can contribute 8 
to a better knowledge of the BLEVE phenomenon. This kind of analysis is not new (Brambilla & 9 
Manca, 2010; Bubbico & Marchini, 2008; Demichela, Piccinini, & Poggio, 2004; Manca & Brambilla, 10 
2010; Planas-Cuchi, Gasulla, et al., 2004) but it is very important to raise awareness of such 11 
explosions and to design new prevention strategies. 12 
5.1. Sequence of the accident 13 
As described in section 3, the LNG tank car caught fire immediately after the collision. Initially the 14 
flames generated black smoke and surrounded the whole tank (Figure 5), which suggests that 15 
probably the wheels, the diesel of the tank and/or the polyurethane insulation were burning. It is 16 
difficult to say if at that point LNG was also contributing to the fire, although it is possible that one 17 
of the pipes or valves (as described in section 4) could have been broken in the collision and 18 
therefore be leaking. Looking at the images taken by the eyewitnesses, what does seem clear is that 19 
after this first stage (around 8:35 h), the fire aspect changed significantly. It had brighter flames and 20 
much less black smoke, which would indicate that it was essentially fueled by natural gas through a 21 
leak somewhere in the central part of the tank hidden by the bank (Figure 6). The bright aspect of 22 
the flames clearly indicates that liquid or two-phase mixture was being released; when this happens, 23 
the combustion is poorer as compared to a pure gas flame (which would be almost transparent), 24 
and the existence of soot particles originates much more luminous flames (Palacios, Muñoz, Darbra, 25 
& Casal, 2012). 26 
When firefighters arrived, at 8:40 h (Figure 7), they noted that almost all the insulation had been 27 
destroyed by the accident and the fire, except for the bottom rear of the tank. The fire was at that 28 
moment surrounding mainly the central part and the top of the tank. Fire at the top of the tank can 29 
6 
 
be explained by the opening of the safety relief valves, discharging LNG as a jet fire impinging on the 1 
top of the tank surface. The valves never stopped discharging until the tank exploded at 9:32 h 2 
(Figure 8); therefore, it can be assumed that the flow rate through each valve was at its maximum 3 
(150 kg·h-1 according to the manufacturer specifications) during approximately one hour. What is 4 
unknown is if the three valves were open or only the ones set at 7-bar pressure. 5 
At 9:31 h firefighters located at 150 m from the tank heard whistles and crackling sounds. They also 6 
saw changes in the brightness of the flames, which made them decide withdrawing further away. 7 
When they were already located approximately 200 m far from the tank, between 30 – 40 s after 8 
they heard the whistles, the tank exploded. There are three plausible hypotheses that could explain 9 
this last sequence of events: 10 
1. Since the truck was equipped with three safety valves (two set at 7 bar and one set at 9.1 11 
bar), it is possible that, until then, the only opened valves were the ones at 7 bar. Due to the 12 
long exposure of the tank to fire and to its progressive heating, these two valves were   13 
unable to keep the pressure in the container and the third valve opened, originating the 14 
whistles heard by the witnesses. Some seconds later, the total loss of containment took 15 
place according to a one-step BLEVE mode of failure (Birk, Davison, & Cunningham, 2007). 16 
2. All three valves were already opened and therefore the tank pressure was at least 9.1 bar 17 
when an initial rupture crack was formed. This event was responsible for the whistles heard 18 
by the witnesses and for the increase in the flames aspect due to the vapor escaping from 19 
the opening. The initial crack could have stopped because of the sudden reduction of the 20 
tank pressure and the cooling effect of the released two-phase stream. However, after 21 
approximately 30 s, the flashing of the liquid due to this sudden loss of pressure, together 22 
with the heat impinging and weakening the tank would have restarted de crack and caused 23 
de total loss of containment, according to a two-step BLEVE mode of failure (Birk et al., 24 
2007). 25 
3. An intermediate situation in which the pressure was maintained between 7 and 9.1 bar, due 26 
to the release of LNG from two safety valves and from a broken pipe, remaining the 9.1 bar 27 
safety valve closed. At a given moment, being the tank unable to keep the internal pressure 28 
due to the loss of mechanical strength because of the high wall temperature, a crack was 29 
formed, progressing later and leading to the vessel explosion. 30 
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It is worth noting that in the hypotheses one and two, the pressure just before the explosion would 1 
have been 9.1 bar, while in the third one it would have been 7 bar. After the explosion, a fireball 2 
lasting some seconds (about 10 s according to the witnesses) was observed. 3 
The content of the tank just before the explosion is unknown due to the losses occurred through 4 
the safety valves and the leakage on the central part of the tank, located most likely in one of the 5 
pipes connected to the devices inside the protective enclosure. The remains of the tank just after 6 
the explosion can be seen in Figure 9. 7 
5.2. Consequences of the accident 8 
Three types of effects where observed in this accident: overpressure due to the explosion, 9 
projection of vessel fragments and radiation due to the fireball. The consequences associated with 10 
these effects were observed mainly in the surroundings and the objects located within a radius of 11 
200 m. There were no casualties (apart from the driver of the truck due to the initial shock), nor 12 
injured. 13 
Concerning the fireball consequences, it was observed that over a radius of approximately 50 m 14 
vegetation and traffic signals were severely burned, and at 90 m pine needles had underwent 15 
pyrolysis. There was no information from the witnesses concerning the dimensions and height of 16 
the fireball. However, some interesting information could be obtained from a tree located 90 m 17 
from the tank (see Figure 10), because its leaves (those facing the fireball) were completely dried 18 
and pyrolysed due to the radiation received (direct impingement of flames can be completely 19 
discarded). According to data reported in the literature (Landucci et al., 2011; Quintiere, 2006) and 20 
discussions with experts on ignition phenomena (Simeoni & Thomas, 2013), a heat flux around 55 21 
kW·m-2 would be required during the fireball duration (approximately 10 s) to completely dry and 22 
pyrolyse the pine needles. This value has been used to estimate the fireball dimensions and, with 23 
this information, the contents of the vessel just before the explosion. A shorter time, for example 5 24 
s, would have required a thermal radiation intensity of approximately 90 kW·m-2, which would 25 
correspond to a fuel mass in the fireball larger than the initial contents of the vessel (see section 26 
6.1) 27 
Concerning the consequences due to the overpressure generated by the tank explosion, they were 28 
mostly observed at the gas station, located at 125 m from the tank (see Figure 11). Large 29 
windowpanes of considerable thickness fell down because the mounting of the frame failed. Smaller 30 
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windows remained essentially unaffected. This suggests that a side-on overpressure value between 1 
0.02 and 0.03 bar (Casal, 2008; Lees & Mannan, 2005) was achieved at this location. It is important 2 
to emphasize here that next to one side of the tank there was a 10 m high hill slope, which would 3 
have reflected the overpressure wave towards the gas station. 4 
Finally, concerning the projection of missiles, the vessel was broken into three large fragments and 5 
other minor pieces such as the baffles that were mostly found in a radius of 200 m. The distribution 6 
was not the typical one expected from this type of vessels, due to the presence of the slope. The 7 
tank three major pieces remained near the explosion point, while other minor pieces (such as the 8 
baffles) were spread around, most of them at the side were the gas station was located. 9 
 10 
6. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 11 
This type of analysis usually starts from the initial event, estimating the mass of substance lost 12 
before the explosion. Then, taking into account the pressure inside the tank, the overpressure 13 
generated can be calculated according to one of the models available in the literature. Finally, the 14 
fireball is estimated following the solid flame model. Nevertheless, as explained in section 5, in the 15 
present accident the mass lost and the pressure inside the vessel just before the explosion are 16 
unknown. Therefore, in this case, the effects observed from the fireball have been used to estimate 17 
the contents of the vessel just before the explosion, and then with this datum the overpressure has 18 
been estimated. 19 
6.1. The fireball and the contents of the vessel before the explosion 20 
To predict the effects from a fireball (i.e. the radiation received by a given target located at a 21 
particular distance), the solid flame model can be applied (Casal, 2008). In this case, taking into 22 
account the location of the tree (see Figure 12), the equations listed below (being the atmospheric 23 
conditions 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 = 16 °C, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 50%), an estimated value of 𝐼𝐼 = 55 kW·m-2 and an initial value of 𝑡𝑡 =24 10 s, it is possible to calculate, by an iterative process, the approximate mass of fuel involved in the 25 
fireball of 𝑀𝑀 = 12,000 kg. 26 
Summary of equations used to apply the solid flame model to the fireball: 27 
𝐼𝐼 = 𝜏𝜏 ∙ 𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 (1) 
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𝜏𝜏 = 2.02 ∙ (𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝑑𝑑)−0.09 (2) 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 = 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 ∙ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅100 (3) ln(𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎) = 23.18986 − 3816.42(𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 − 46.13) (4) 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝐷𝐷24 ∙ (𝐷𝐷 2⁄ + 𝑑𝑑)2 (5) 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 = 𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝑀𝑀 ∙ ∆𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝜋𝜋 ∙ 𝐷𝐷2 ∙ 𝑡𝑡  (6) 
𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 = 0.00325 ∙ 𝑃𝑃0.32 (7) 
𝐷𝐷 = 5.8 ∙ 𝑀𝑀1 3⁄  (8) 
𝑡𝑡 = 0.9 ∙ 𝑀𝑀0.25 (9) 
𝑅𝑅 = 0.75 ∙ 𝐷𝐷 (10) 
𝑑𝑑 = (𝑥𝑥2 + (𝑅𝑅 − 16)2)1 2⁄ − 𝐷𝐷2  (11) 
 1 
Once the mass of fuel known, the geometric characteristics of the fireball and its duration can also 2 
be estimated: 3 
𝐷𝐷 ≅ 133 m 4 
𝑡𝑡 ≅ 9.4 s 5 
𝑅𝑅 ≅ 100 m 6 
These results are consistent with the observed effects of thermal radiation over the ground, as 7 
described in section 5.2. Moreover, from the mass remaining in the tank just before the explosion, 8 
in can be concluded that around 8,000 kg of natural gas were lost before the explosion (40 % of the 9 
total contents). Taking into account the maximum flow that the safety valves could discharge (150 10 
kg·h-1) and that they would have been discharging during 1 hour approximately, it is sure that there 11 
was a leak from somewhere else. Still, it remains unclear whether only the two valves set at 7 bar 12 
were open or the valve set at 9.1 bar was open as well.  13 
 14 
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6.2. The BLEVE and the pressure inside the vessel before the explosion 1 
The mass of fuel calculated in the previous section has been used to estimate the overpressure 2 
generated by the BLEVE explosion following the method proposed by Planas-Cuchi et al. (Planas-3 
Cuchi, Salla, & Casal, 2004) which, according to several authors (Bubbico & Marchini, 2008; 4 
Laboureur, Heymes, Lapebie, Buchlin, & Rambaud, 2014) seems to be the most realistic approach. 5 
This method takes into account the real expansion work done when the whole content of the vessel 6 
changes from the explosion state to the final state, considering real gas behavior and adiabatic 7 
irreversible expansion. This work must be equal to the change in internal energy of the vessel 8 
content: 9 
𝐸𝐸 = −𝑃𝑃 ∙ ∆𝑉𝑉 = ∆𝑈𝑈 (12)   
 10 
−∆𝑈𝑈 = (𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿0 − 𝑢𝑢𝑉𝑉0) ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿0 + 𝑈𝑈 (13) 
 11 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑃𝑃 ∙ 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿0 − 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑃𝑃 + 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿0 − 𝑈𝑈[(𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿0 − 𝑢𝑢𝑉𝑉0) − (𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉0 − 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿0) ∙ 𝑃𝑃] ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 (14) 
 12 
The vessel pressure just before the explosion must be known to apply this method and, as said in 13 
the previous sections, we can only hypothesize that the pressure was probably at some point 14 
between 7 to 9.1 bar. Therefore, calculations have been performed for these two values to obtain 15 
the explosion energy, 𝐸𝐸 (see Table 3). 16 
Once the explosion energy is known, diverse methods can be used to estimate the overpressure 17 
reaching a given target (Baker, Cox, Kulesz, Strehlow, & Westine, 1983; CCPS, 2010; Planas & Casal, 18 
2015). 19 
The most widely used method is the one in which the explosion energy is converted into TNT 20 
equivalent mass (see equation (15)), taking into account the energy of the TNT, Δ𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 21 
(approximately 4.68 MJ·kg-1); most authors assume that the fraction of the total energy converted 22 
into pressure wave, 𝛽𝛽, is 0.5: 23 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝐸Δ𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 1.068 ∙ 10−7 ∙ 𝐸𝐸 (15) 
11 
 
 1 
Once the TNT equivalent mass is known, the scaled distance can be obtained:  2 
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 = 𝑅𝑅(𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)1/3 (16) 
 3 
and the overpressure is then estimated by using a ∆𝑃𝑃 vs. 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 diagram for a surface explosion (Casal, 4 
2008). This method takes into account the ground reflection of the pressure wave when the 5 
explosion takes place on the ground. 6 
The calculation has also been performed by the method proposed by the TNO (van den Bosch et al., 7 
2005). This method assumes real gas behavior and isentropic expansion to estimate the explosion 8 
energy. Then also uses the graph of a non-dimensional pressure vs. non-dimensional distance (in 9 
this case, based on pentolite) (Baker et al., 1983) to estimate the overpressure; this graph doesn’t 10 
take into account the ground reflection and therefore this is considered in equation (24). These are 11 
the equations used: 12 
 13 
𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿 = 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿1 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿0𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉0 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿0 (17) 
𝑋𝑋𝑉𝑉 = 𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉1 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿0𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉0 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿0 (18) 
𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿0 = (1 − 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿) ∙ ℎ𝐿𝐿0 + 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿 ∙ ℎ𝑉𝑉0 − (1 − 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿) ∙ 𝑃𝑃0 ∙ 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿0 − 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿 ∙ 𝑃𝑃0 ∙ 𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉0 (19) 
𝑢𝑢𝑉𝑉0 = (1 − 𝑋𝑋𝑉𝑉) ∙ ℎ𝐿𝐿0 + 𝑋𝑋𝑉𝑉 ∙ ℎ𝑉𝑉0 − (1 − 𝑋𝑋𝑉𝑉) ∙ 𝑃𝑃0 ∙ 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿0 − 𝑋𝑋𝑉𝑉 ∙ 𝑃𝑃0 ∙ 𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉0 (20) 
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = (𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿1 − 𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿0) ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 (21) 
𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 = (𝑢𝑢𝑉𝑉1 − 𝑢𝑢𝑉𝑉0) ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉  (22) 
𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 + 𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 (23) 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 2 ∙ 𝐸𝐸 (24) 
𝑅𝑅� = 𝑅𝑅 ∙ � 𝑃𝑃0
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
�
1 3⁄
 (25) 
Δ𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠 ∙ 1.01325 (26) 
 14 
12 
 
This method assumes –with a conservative approach- that all the released energy is converted in 1 
pressure wave (i.e., β = 1). The overpressure value obtained with equation (26) must be later 2 
adjusted to take into account the geometry effects. For cylindrical vessels Δ𝑃𝑃 has to be multiplied 3 
by 4 if 𝑅𝑅� < 0.3, by 1.6 if 0.3< 𝑅𝑅� < 3.5 and by 1.4 if 𝑅𝑅� > 3.5. 4 
The same two values of the pressure inside the vessel just before the explosion (7 and 9.1 bar) have 5 
been assumed, as in the previous method. Results have been summarized in Table 4. Important 6 
differences are obtained between both methods, being the results from the isentropic (adiabatic 7 
reversible) assumption more than 300% larger than those corresponding to the adiabatic 8 
irreversible assumption. 9 
Another aspect should be taken into account in this specific case: the presence of a practically 10 
vertical wall next to one side of the vessel adds a new reflection to the pressure wave (see Figure 11 
13), not taken into account so far. Therefore, in the case of the Planas-Cuchi et al. method, the same 12 
equations have been applied but using the energy value 𝐸𝐸 multiplied by 2: 13 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 2 ∙ 𝐸𝐸Δ𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 2.136 ∙ 10−7 ∙ 𝐸𝐸 (27) 
 14 
And in the case of the TNO method, expression (24) has been substituted by: 15 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 4 ∙ 𝐸𝐸 (28) 
 16 
In order to compare the results of the peak overpressure generated by the blast wave according to 17 
both methods, three options have been considered. First the Planas-Cuchi et al. method with the 18 
TNT equivalent as described by equations (16) and (27); secondly the original TNO method as 19 
described by equations (25), (26) and (28); and finally, this method but including the same factor 𝛽𝛽, 20 
as used in the first one. All these results have been summarized in Table 5. 21 
Looking at the results obtained, it seems that the model proposed by the TNO, even when applying 22 
the 𝛽𝛽 = 0.5 factor, tends to overpredict the overpressure, as in all the tested cases gives values 23 
around 0.05 bar. The method by Planas-Cuchi et al. provides values in the expected range. However, 24 
no large differences are observed between the values obtained at 7 and 9 bar, which does not allow 25 
13 
 
extracting definite conclusions concerning the pressure achieved in the tank just before the 1 
explosion. 2 
7. LESSONS LEARNT 3 
One of the most important results that one should expect from the analysis of past accidents is the 4 
extraction of lessons learnt. In this case, from the analysis of the Zarzalico accident, a few lessons 5 
can be inferred.  6 
− Even though the tank was insulated with polyurethane, this accident has demonstrated 7 
again that both the road accident impact and the fire can destroy significantly the insulating 8 
layer. If, as happened in this case, there is a fire, it can affect the vessel. This study case 9 
serves to underline the wise move of total banning for non-vacuum insulated tanks 10 
manufacturing, by the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism since September 11 
2013. 12 
− An essential aspect in this type of accident is the possibility that flames impinge on the tank 13 
wall. If this happens and impingement takes place above the liquid level, the wall 14 
temperature will dramatically increase and, even if safety valves are correctly operating, it 15 
is possible that the vessel cannot stand the pressure. In this situation, the explosion can 16 
occur at any moment from the beginning of the fire. 17 
− The thermal radiation from the fireball reached a significant distance, covering a circular 18 
zone (lethality (1%) reach: 170 m; first degree burns (1%) reach: 295 m; both values without 19 
any clothing protection). Therefore, the thermal effects must be considered a very 20 
important aspect in these accidents. 21 
− The blast effects were as well significant, originating damage to buildings at 125 m. As for 22 
the vessel breaking pattern, it was broken in three large fragments (two large fragments are 23 
more common: 60% of cases) which, probably due to the nearby bank wall, remained near 24 
the explosion site; however, minor pieces were ejected over distances up to 200 m; this is 25 
also an interesting information concerning the safety distances to be considered. 26 
− Although the explosion and fireball effects were severe and covered a large area, neither 27 
casualties (except for the car driver, due to the initial crash) nor injured people occurred. 28 
This was because the management of the emergency was quite sound, evacuating a 600 m 29 
radius area from the arrival of firefighters and cutting completely the motorway traffic, and 30 
later on moving the firefighters themselves from 150 m to 200 m away. 31 
14 
 
 1 
8. CONCLUSIONS 2 
The continuous increase in the consumption of natural gas is associated to the corresponding 3 
growth in the distribution by both cryogenic road tankers and pipelines. Road tankers are exposed 4 
to the risk of undergoing a road accident and, in fact, this happens from time to time. In this case, 5 
the possibility of having a fire and eventually a BLEVE is not negligible at all.  6 
The mathematical models applied have shown a relatively good performance according to the 7 
observed thermal and mechanical consequences. 8 
The study of such accidents is clearly a useful tool to learn and improve the safety of such 9 
transportation mode. It is quite interesting to get a better understanding of them, especially 10 
because of the lack of experimental data at large scale. Finally, it is also interesting to highlight that 11 
this type of case study may provide support for future understanding and modelling of the behavior 12 
of pressure vessels storing cryogenic substances when exposed to fires. 13 
 14 
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NOMENCLATURE 22 
𝑑𝑑 Distance between the target and the flame surface, m 23 
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 Scaled distance, m·kg-1/3 24 
𝐷𝐷 Diameter of the fireball, m 25 
𝐸𝐸 Explosion energy, J 26 
15 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 Explosion energy of the liquid, MJ 1 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 Average emissive power of the flames, kW·m-2 2 
𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉  Explosion energy of the vapor, MJ 3 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 Explosion energy converted into pressure wave, MJ 4 
𝐹𝐹 View factor, -- 5 
ℎ𝐿𝐿0 Enthalpy of the liquid at the final state, kJ·kg-1 6 
ℎ𝑝𝑝0 Enthalpy of the vapor at the final state, kJ·kg-1 7 
𝑅𝑅 Height at which the center of the fireball is located, m 8 
∆𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐 Heat of combustion (lower value) of the fuel, kJ·kg-1 9 
𝐼𝐼 Thermal radiation intensity reaching a given target, kW·m-2 10 
𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 Total mass of the vessel content, kg 11 
𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 Mass of liquid in the vessel at conditions just before the explosion, kg 12 
𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉 Mass of vapor in the vessel at conditions just before the explosion, kg 13 
𝑀𝑀 Mass of fuel in the fireball, kg 14 
𝑃𝑃 Pressure in the vessel just before the explosion, Pa 15 
𝑃𝑃0 Atmospheric pressure, Pa 16 
𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠 Dimensionless pressure, -- 17 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 Partial pressure of water in the atmosphere, Pa 18 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 Saturated water vapor pressure at the atmospheric temperature, Pa 19 
∆𝑃𝑃 Overpressure generated by the vessel explosion, bar 20 
𝑅𝑅 Distance between the center of the explosion and the point where overpressure must be 21 
calculated, m 22 
16 
 
𝑅𝑅� Dimensionless distance, -- 1 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 Relative humidity, % 2 
𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿0 Specific entropy of the liquid at the final state, J·kg-1·K-1 3 
𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉0 Specific entropy of the vapour at the final state, J·kg-1·K-1 4 
𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿1 Specific entropy of the liquid just before the explosion, J·kg-1·K-1 5 
𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉1 Specific entropy of the vapour just before the explosion, J·kg-1·K-1 6 
𝑡𝑡 Time corresponding to the duration of the fireball, s 7 
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 Ambient temperature, K 8 
𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿0 Specific internal energy of the liquid at the final state of the adiabatic process, J·kg-1 9 
𝑢𝑢𝑉𝑉0 Specific internal energy of the vapour at the final state of the adiabatic process, J·kg-1 10 
𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿1 Specific internal energy of the liquid just before the explosion, J·kg-1 11 
𝑢𝑢𝑉𝑉1 Specific internal energy of the vapour just before the explosion, J·kg-1 12 
𝑈𝑈 Overall internal energy of the vessel at conditions just before the explosion, J 13 
∆𝑈𝑈 Overall variation of the internal energy of the vessel content, J 14 
𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉0 Specific volume of vapor at the final state of the adiabatic process, m3·kg-1 15 
𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿0 Specific volume of liquid at the final state of the adiabatic process, m3·kg-1 16 
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 Total vessel volume, m3 17 
∆𝑉𝑉 Volume variation of the total content of the vessel when changing from the explosion state 18 
to atmospheric pressure conditions, m3 19 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 Equivalent mass of TNT, kg 20 
Δ𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 TNT energy of explosion, J·kg-1 21 
17 
 
𝑥𝑥 Vapour fraction (with respect to the total mass) at the final state of the adiabatic irreversible 1 
process, -- 2 
𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿 Vapor ratio of saturated liquid, -- 3 
𝑋𝑋𝑉𝑉 Vapor ratio of saturated vapor, -- 4 
𝛽𝛽 Fraction of the explosion energy converted into blast wave, -- 5 
𝜏𝜏 Atmospheric transmissivity, -- 6 
𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 Radiant heat fraction, -- 7 
 8 
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TABLES CAPTIONS 1 
Table 1. Accidents occurred in Spain with LNG road tankers since 1999 (modified from Bonilla et al. (Bonilla 2 
Martinez, Belmonte Pérez, & Marín Ayala, 2012)). 3 
Table 2. Characteristics of the road tanker involved in the Zarzalico accident. 4 
Table 3. Explosion energy obtained according to the model proposed by Planas-Cuchi et al. (2004)*  5 
Table 4. Explosion energy obtained according to the model proposed by TNO (van den Bosch et al., 2005)*.  6 
Table 5. Peak overpressure (bar) results obtained according to the three methodologies applied. 7 
 8 
 9 
FIGURES CAPTIONS 10 
Figure 1. LNG terminals in Europe (Blikom, 2011). 11 
Figure 2. Accidents occurred in Spain with LNG road tankers since 1999 (modified from (Bonilla Martinez et 12 
al., 2012)) 13 
Figure 3. Location of the place where the accident occurred. 14 
Figure 4. Truck carrying two large precast concrete panels stopped on the highway shoulder just after 15 
colliding with the LNG tanker at 8:21 h (source: Murcia Fire Service). 16 
Figure 5. Truck in flames few minutes after the collision at: (a) 8:25 h, (b) 8:30 h (source: Murcia Fire 17 
Service). 18 
Figure 6. Fire with brighter flames and less black smoke at 8:35 h (source: Murcia Fire Service) 19 
Figure 7. State of the fire when firefighters arrived on site at 8:40 h; now an intense fire is observed on the 20 
top of the tank, probably due to the safety venting (source: Murcia Fire Service). 21 
Figure 8. One of the latest images before the explosion, taken at 9:30 h (source: Murcia Fire Service). 22 
Figure 9. Vessel condition after failure. a) Big fragment that remained near the wall were the truck was 23 
stopped; b) Rear view of the previous fragment allowing to see part of the engine and tractor wheels; c) 24 
Biggest part of the vessel that remained on the motorway median; d) Previous fragment from another view 25 
point. 26 
Figure 10. Tree affected by the fireball radiation, located at 90 m from the tank (source: Murcia Fire Service). 27 
Figure 11. Minor damages caused by the explosion to windows and ceilings (source: Murcia Fire Service). 28 
Figure 12. Scheme of the fireball position in relation to the tree affected by the radiation 29 
Figure 13. Reflection of the pressure wave on the ground and on the presence of a talus. 30 
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TABLES 1 
Table 1.  2 
Date Place Effects Consequences 
27/01/1999 Sevilla Tanker tire fire --- 
10/10/2000 Jabugo (Huelva) Tanker overturning --- 
12/06/2002 Beas (Huelva) Tanker overturning --- 
22/06/2002 Tivissa (Tarragona) Tanker fire and explosion Driver died, some injured, a home seriously damaged  
04/12/2002 Huelva Tanker overturning Driver slightly injured 
24/03/2004 Jabugo (Huelva) Fire in the truck cabin --- 
11/10/2007 Algodonales (Cadiz) Tanker overturning and leak Driver died 
19/08/2008 Reolid (Albacete) Tanker overturning and leak Driver died 
25/10/2010 Sanlúcar la Mayor (Huelva) Leak through the valves --- 
20/10/2011 Zarzalico (Murcia) Tanker fire and explosion Driver died, damages to a home and a gas station 
27/10/2011 Ribarroja (Valencia) Tanker overturning --- 
21/11/2011 Palos (Huelva) Rear end crash of empty tank Driver seriously injured 
14/01/2012 Puerto Lumbreras (Murcia) Empty tanker overturning Driver seriously injured 
17/01/2012 Puerto Lumbreras (Murcia) Empty tanker overturning --- 
24/01/2012 Huelva Tanker overturning --- 
 3 
Table 2.  4 
Item Value 
Total length 14.04 m 
Inner diameter 2.34 m 
Outer diameter 2.6 m 
Nominal total volume 56.5 m3 
LNG capacity 21,000 kg 
Maximum pressure service 7 bar 
Storage Pressure 1 bar 
Storage temperature -160 °C 
Design temperature +50°C / -196 °C 
Vessel material Stainless steel 304LN 
Vessel thickness 4 mm (body) / 6 mm (bottom) 
Inner breakwaters 7 elements (3 mm) 
Isolation Polyurethane (130 mm) 
Envelope Aluminium (2 mm) 
Safety valves 3 (two at 7 bar, one at 9.1 bar) 
22 
 
 1 
Table 3.  2 
 
7 bar 9.1 bar 
Explosion 
state Final state 
Explosion 
state Final state 
Pressure (kPa) 700 100 910 100 
Temperature (K) 141 112 147 112 
Total mass (kg) 12000 12000 12000 12000 
Mass of liquid (kg) 11784 8996 11730 8505 
Mass of vapor (kg) 216 3004 270 3495 
Vapor specific volume (m3·kg-1) 0.1096 0.502 0.085 0.502 
Liquid specific volume (m3·kg-1) 0.0028 0.0024 0.003 0.0024 
Vapor volume (m3) 23.6 1509 22.9 1755 
Liquid volume (m3) 32.9 21 33.6 20 
Total volume (m3) 56.5 1530 56.5 1775 
Mass vapor fraction 0.018 0.3 0.023 0.3 
Vapor specific internal energy (kJ·kg-1) 763 747 771 747 
Liquid specific internal energy (kJ·kg-1) 398 279 418 279 
Vapor internal energy (MJ) 164 2244 208 2611 
Liquid internal energy (MJ) 4689 2514 4900 2376 
Total internal energy (MJ) 4854 4757 5108 4987 
Explosion energy (MJ) 97 121 
*The properties of natural gas have been assimilated to methane and obtained from (Green & Perry, 2007) 3 
and (Younglove & Ely, 1987) 4 
 5 
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Table 4.  2 
 
7 bar 9.1 bar 
Explosion 
state Final state 
Explosion 
state Final state 
Pressure (kPa) 700 100 910 100 
Temperature (°C) 141 112 147 112 
Total mass (kg) 12000 12000 12000 12000 
Mass of liquid (kg) 11784 nn 11730 nn 
Mass of vapor (kg) 216 nn 270 nn 
Vapor specific volume (m3·kg-1) 0.1096 0.502 0.085 0.502 
Liquid specific volume (m3·kg-1) 0.0028 0.0024 0.003 0.0024 
Vapor specific internal energy (kJ·kg-1) 763 691 771 681 
Liquid specific internal energy (kJ·kg-1) 398 364 418 378 
Vapor specific entropy (kJ·kg-1·K-1) 8.96 9.51 8.87 9.51 
Liquid specific entropy (kJ·kg-1·K-1) 5.78 4.95 5.91 4.95 
Vapor enthalpy (kJ·kg-1) nn 797 nn 797 
Liquid enthalpy (kJ·kg-1) nn 280 nn 280 
Vapor ratio of saturated vapor, 𝑋𝑋𝑉𝑉  0.88  0.86 
Vapor ratio of saturated liquid, 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿  0.18  0.21 
Explosion energy of the vapor (MJ) 16 24 
Explosion energy of the liquid (MJ) 406 472 
Total explosion energy (MJ) 422 496 
*The properties of natural gas have been assimilated to methane and obtained from (Green & Perry, 3 
2007) and (Younglove & Ely, 1987) 4 
nn means that these values are not needed for the calculations 5 
 6 
Table 5.  7 
Pressure 
(bar) 
Planas-Cuchi et al TNO original TNO with 𝜷𝜷 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
(kg) 
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 
(m·kg-1/3) 
Δ𝑃𝑃 
(bar) 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
(MJ) 
𝑅𝑅� 
(--) 
Δ𝑃𝑃 
(bar) 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
(MJ) 
𝑅𝑅� 
(--) 
Δ𝑃𝑃 
(bar) 
7 41 45.6 0.021 1686 4.89 0.055 843 6.17 0.045 
9.1 52 42.3 0.023 1984 4.64 0.059 992 5.84 0.049 
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Figure 5.  2 
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Figure 6.  1 
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Figure 8.  1 
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Figure 12.  2 
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